This work analyzes a proof-of-stake algorithm addressing several questions --how forgers are chosen (uniform vs. exponential), whether a rational forger should split itself into several smaller forgers, and what advantage it can gain by gaming the system and choosing one of its forgers such that its own forgers are chosen in future steps. The paper addresses important issues, reaching non-trivial results.
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Reviewer B:
The results themselves are interesting and give important analysis on PoS type scheme. One major disadvantage of this paper is its structure. Author should restructure the paper according to statements of problems, taxonomy of attacking methodology and well-grained analysis structure and conclusion. The paper is about cryptocurrency, Nxt.
Like Bitcoin, Nxt is block-chain-based cryptocurrency; it is based on P2P and is decentralized.
However, the underlying design concept of it, "Proof-of-Stake", is different from that of Bitcoin, "Proof-of-Work".
In "Proof-of-Stake" currency, the total amount of coins is fixed in advance and never changes; there is no client puzzle and no one mines a new coin.
In this type of currency, users have their own accounts and in each block generation phase, some existent account is randomly selected, and receives the intermediate fee in each transaction in this period as a reward.
This intermediate fee is the alternative incentive for generating new blocks in the "Proofof-Stake" currency.
Note that in a jargon around the "Proof-of-Stake" community, to get the right of gaining intermediate fee is called "forging" because "forging" means the place to heat metal in order to make something (such as a coin).
In the "Proof-of-Stake" concept, the probability that an account can get the right of forging increases if the account has more coins (or in a jargon, "stake").
Ideally (for the "Proof-of-Stake" concept), the probability should be proportional to the stake of the account.
Although there were cryptocurrencies based on hybrid of both "Proof-of-Stake" and "Proof-of-Work" concepts, Nxt is the first cryptocurrency which is based only on "Proof-of-Stake" concept.
[The Subject of This Paper]
In the submitted paper, the authors study security of Nxt.
The authors mainly concern with what will happen when an attacker can gain large stake (compared to other honest users) and/or an attacker can exploit multiple accounts. (Making multiple accounts is possible without deviating from the Nxt protocol).
Let N be the number of active users of Nxt and b \in [0,1] be the "normalized" stake of the attacker, that is, (the stake of the attacker)/(the sum of stakes of all active users).
[Sec 2 and 3] In Section 2 and 3, the authors consider the case where b is very large compared to the normalized stakes of the other users and show that the probability P that the attacker can get right of forging is b + b^2 +O(b^3), when N -> \infty and b\to 0.
As mentioned before, the above probability in an ideal "Proof-of-Stake" cryptocurrency should equal to b.
Hence, the probability, P=b+b^2+O(b^3), for Nxt is larger than the ideal one. But I cannot understand the authors want to say whether "Nxt is good because P is almost same as b" or "Nxt is not good because P is much larger than b".
[Sec 3.1] (result)
The authors consider the case where an attacker has multiple accounts.
Then they show that the multiple accounts are meaningless for gaining right of forging because the probability P that the attacker can get right of forging is largest when the attacker deposits all of its stake in one account.
(comment)
This is good result because the result implies that we can concentrate on studying security under the condition that an adversary has only one account. From organization of the paper, I wonder why this is a subsection. vi The authors estimate the expected length that a user forges consecutive blocks of chain. Then the authors estimate the probability Q that an attacker succeeds in forging m consecutive blocks of chain offline.
Then they show that -if b < 1/3, Q exponentially converges to 0, when the number m of blocks becomes \infty, -if b \ge 1/3, Q is almost 1 even when m is large.
(Technical comment)
This is good analysis too, but again, I cannot understand what is the consequence of the analysis.
The authors say that m=10 or so (in page 10).
This means that even if b=0.05, Q becomes \delta(0.05)^{m} =0.2^{10} = 1/10^7. 1/10^7 is not very small when we compare it with, e.g., the probability 1/10^24 that the attacker succeeds in breaking a 160-bit hashing.
Security of Nxt depends on both the significance of the incident (succeeding in counterfeiting blocks) and the probability Q that the incident happens.
Hence, the author has to clarify what damage would happen if an attacker succeeds in counterfeiting blocks of chains and has to give the conclusion whether 1/10^7 is large or not.
Moreover, the validity on the assumption of the size of m(=10).
[Sec 6] I failed to understand the details of this section.
Probably, the authors want to say that when an attacker succeeds in taking right of forging (e.g. by depositing all of its stake in one account as described in Sec 3.1), the attacker can maximize the probability that it takes right of forging of the next phase by splitting its stake into lots of accounts.
In particular, if an attacker succeeds in getting 50% of all existent stakes, it can forge all the blocks.
However, this conflicts with the result described in Section 3.1. It was difficult to understand if there is any assumption difference.
[Other Results] l e d g e r j o u r n a l . o r g ISSN 2379-5980 (online) associated article DOI 10.5915/LEDGER. 2016.46 vii The authors consider another algorithm, called Exp-algorithm, to determine who can have right of forging.
Exp-algorithm is different from the algorithm of Nxt, called U-algorithm, to determine it.
The authors show that Exp-algorithm is better than U-algorithm in some ways.
Again, I cannot understand what is the consequence of this claim.
Do the authors want to say that we should create new cryptocurrency based on Expalgorithm?
[Editorial Comments]
The paper is not self-contained. The paper should be understandable even for readers who are not familiar with cryptocurrency.
The author has to explain technical procedures, especially the details of "Proof-of-Stake" and the details of the block chain algorithm of Nxt.
Perhaps many of my comments are due to lack of this explanation.
[Evaluation]
The result is interesting and I think that the paper is acceptable.
However, as mentioned before, the authors do not write the consequences of their results in using Nxt.
Due to the lack of them, I do not recommend accepting the paper as it is.
1B. Author's Response
I've rewritten the introduction (it became twice as big) to address several referee's comments. In particular, the changes to in the introduction include:
• a basic comparison of the PoW and PoS protocols, and some notes on the terminology used • added an observation that the subject of the paper is the so-called "pure PoS", and added a note on other PoS versions (such as those that include coin-age) • added a note on some common attacks on the PoS-protocol; however, discussing all these attacks is well beyond the scope of this paper. Added references to some papers of The Consensus Research, where these attacks are discussed at length. • also, added some explanations on the model (in particular, about the time) to Section 2 block (which is the subject of Section 3) Sec 4 and 5 (Technical comment) This is good analysis too, but again, I cannot understand what is the consequence of the analysis. The authors say that m=10 or so (in page 10). This means that even if b=0.05, Q becomes \delta(0.05)^{m} =0.2^{10} = 1/10^7. 1/10^7 is not very small when we compare it with, e.g., the probability 1/10^24 that the attacker succeeds in breaking a 160-bit hashing.
Security of Nxt depends on both the significance of the incident (succeeding in counterfeiting blocks) and the probability Q that the incident happens. Hence, the author has to clarify what damage would happen if an attacker succeeds in counterfeiting blocks of chains and has to give the conclusion whether 1/10^7 is large or not. Moreover, the validity on the assumption of the size of m(=10).
• m=10 was a sort of "rule of thumb" in the Nxt for accepting transactions (similar to "wait 6 blocks" in Bitcoin). It is true that 1/10^7 is not very small compared with the probability that the attacker succeeds in breaking a 160-bit hashing, but
